The "Chicken" Game of the Internet
Peering works smoothly when the traffic flow is roughly symmetrical — I send you as much data as you send me, so neither party is subsidizing the other.
But what happens when the balance tips dramatically?
Consider a large content provider (like Netflix or YouTube) peering with a consumer ISP (like Comcast or Verizon). The traffic is heavily asymmetric: terabytes of video flowing into the ISP's network every hour, with very little flowing back. The ISP's network must absorb and distribute all of that traffic to millions of home subscribers.
The ISP argues: "This isn't a fair exchange. You're dumping enormous costs onto my network — I have to upgrade my infrastructure to handle your traffic. You should pay me for transit." The content provider argues: "Your customers are the ones requesting this content. That's what they pay you for. We're delivering value to your subscribers."
If negotiations fail, one side may terminate the peering agreement. This is a de-peering event. The direct, free link is severed. Traffic must now be rerouted through paid transit providers, which often have less capacity on those paths.
The Result for Users: Severe congestion, buffering, high latency, and degraded service — until the two corporations resolve their dispute. The users caught in the middle have no visibility into why Netflix is suddenly unwatchable.
A Real Example: In 2014, Netflix and Comcast had a highly publicized dispute. Netflix's traffic was being throttled as it traversed congested interconnection points. Netflix ultimately agreed to pay Comcast for direct interconnection (essentially a paid peering or transit arrangement). This dispute helped fuel the net neutrality debate in the United States.
BGP Hijacking: When Routing Goes Wrong
A related failure mode is BGP hijacking — when a network accidentally or maliciously announces IP prefixes it doesn't own. Because BGP is built on trust (networks accept route announcements from their peers without cryptographic verification by default), a misconfigured or malicious AS can announce "I own Google's IP space" and suddenly attract traffic meant for Google.
In 2010, China Telecom briefly announced routes for thousands of IP prefixes belonging to US government agencies, major banks, and internet companies. Traffic was rerouted through China for about 18 minutes. This was likely accidental (a route leak), but it demonstrated the fragility of BGP's trust model.
The long-term fix is RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) — a cryptographic system where IP address holders sign their route announcements, allowing routers to reject invalid ones. RPKI adoption is growing but not yet universal.
Key Point: De-peering events expose the fragile, trust-based nature of internet interconnection. BGP hijacking — whether accidental or malicious — can redirect global traffic in minutes. RPKI is the emerging cryptographic defense, but the internet's routing system still relies heavily on good-faith behavior between network operators.